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STEVEN W. BENDER*

Castles in the Sand: Balancing
Public Custom and Private
Ownership Interests on Oregon's
Beaches

Qbeach

regonians can boast rightfully about the unique privilege of
access and recreation that the public enjoys on Oregon's 362-mile coastline. Although about half of Oregon's
beaches are privately owned,' Oregon's Supreme Court in 1969
invoked the English doctrine of custom to declare an easement
for the public to enjoy Oregon's privately titled dry sand
beaches. 2 Nationally, Oregon is credited with, and sometimes
criticized for, resuscitating the custom doctrine as applied to
0

* B.S., University of Oregon, 1982; J.D., University of Oregon School of Law,
1985. Associate Professor of Law and Acting Director, Law and Entrepreneurship
Center, University of Oregon School of Law, Eugene, Oregon. This article is an
expanded version of my presentation for the regulatory takings panel at the Oregon
Land Use Symposium in Portland, Oregon, sponsored by the Law and Entrepreneurship Center and the Oregon Law Review. Laura Anderson, Marnie Ganotis,
and Dick Hildreth made helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Patrick
Burpee and Mark Mengelberg made valuable research contributions.
1 Peter D. Sleeth & Foster Church, Oregon's Crowded Coast, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland), July 6, 1997, at Al (54% of Oregon coastline is held in public ownership
and 46% held privately).
2 State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). This article will
refer to the dry sand area as it was defined in Thornton-the land between the line
of mean high tide and the visible line of vegetation. Id. at 672-73. This article will
also refer to uplands property, meaning property immediately landward of the line
of vegetation. Finally, this article will refer to the wet sand area, meaning the land
lying seaward of the mean high tide line and extending to the extreme low tide line.
The litigants in Thornton conceded the state's ownership of the wet sand area. Id.
at 673. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 390.615 (1997) (ownership of the shore from
ordinary high tide to extreme low tide is vested in the State of Oregon and held as a
state recreation area; as originally enacted in 1913, this legislation designated the
wet sands as a public highway, a 1947 amendment changed the purpose to one of
public recreation).

[913]
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beach rights.' In almost all other states with ocean frontage,
public recreation rights on privately owned beaches exist on a
piecemeal basis that relies primarily on the parcel-specific doctrines of easements by prescription and implied dedication. 4 Several states have refused to apply the custom doctrine on behalf of
the beach-going public or have concluded that the elements of
custom were not established. 5 Custom has found favor elsewhere in cases involving beaches in Florida, Hawai'i, and Texas.6
In Texas, however, the customary use of beaches has not reached

its Supreme Court for consideration. 7 In contrast to the borderto-border application of custom in Oregon,8 the Florida Supreme
Court has applied custom to dry sand beaches on a parcel-specific basis. 9 Finally, a federal court has held that the application
3 See David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1996).
4 See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Implied Acceptance, By Public Use,
of Dedication of Beach or Shoreline Adjoining Public Waters, 24 A.L.R. 4th 294
(1981). See also PAUL D. KOMAR, THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST COAST 175 (1998)
(noting in comparison to Oregon that less than one-fifth of the 1200 miles of coastline in California is open to the public); Jonathan M. Hoff, Comment, Public Beach
Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1981) ("In a state such as California ....
where private
ownership and development of the beach area have been more common, evidence
may not be available to show public use of a particular beach site since the beginning
of the state's history. The custom theory certainly cannot be applied broadly to the
entirety of California's beachland.").
5 See, e.g., Smith v. Bruce, 244 S.E.2d 559, 569 (Ga. 1978) (rejecting custom doctrine); Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630
(Md. 1975) (claimant could not establish custom antiquity requirement). See also
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (describing the
custom doctrine as an "archaic judicial response" to the problem of beach access,
and employing the public trust doctrine to invalidate the practice of quasi-public
association to limit access to municipal beach by non-residents); on New Jersey's use
of the public trust doctrine, see generally Thomas J. Fellig, Pursuit of the Public
Trust: Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v. Avon to Matthews v. BHIA, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985).
6 In addition to its use in Florida, Hawai'i, and Texas, the custom doctrine has
been relied upon to establish public rights to use Virgin Island beaches. See United
States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (D. V.I. 1974) (requiring
removal of fences erected by private club on dry sand), affd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir.
1975).
7 See Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. App. 1986) writ refd n.r.e. (Jan.
19, 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (holding public had acquired right to use
private landowner's beach under ancient common law doctrine of custom).
8 See discussion infra Part I.B.
9 See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974)
(concluding that through undisputed and uninterrupted use for many years the public had gained rights under custom to use a particular beach); see also Reynolds v.
County of Volusia, 659 So.2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that cusHeinOnline -- 77 Or. L. Rev. 914 1998
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of custom to Hawaiian beaches by Hawai'i's Supreme Court is
contrary to established precedent there and an unconstitutional
taking. 10
Although much has been written about Oregon's unique legacy of public privilege to use private beaches, that scholarship
has tended to focus on articulation as well as spirited critique of
the custom doctrine.'1 More recently, commentators have addressed the question of whether the public's beach rights can
withstand scrutiny under the constitutional takings doctrine. 2 In
contrast, this Article assumes that the custom doctrine is
tom doctrine as annunciated in Florida requires a court to ascertain in each case the
degree of ancient use made of the beach).
10 See Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 479-81 (D. Haw. 1978)
(stating that in contrast to Oregon's application of custom, no evidence of public use
was offered in state court to establish customary use of the beach in controversy,
also noting that evidence in federal court demonstrated ancient private uses of
Hawai'i's most widely-known beach-Waikiki Beach; and concluding that fixing the
boundary of public use and ownership as the line of vegetation rather than the high
water mark was contrary to established practice, history, and precedent), rejecting
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 62 (Haw. 1973) (holding that for purposes of proceeding to condemn registered oceanfront property, the seaward boundary should be located along the vegetation line rather than debris line); see also In re
Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 78 (Haw. 1968) (finding the boundary of parcels described in
royal patents as running along the sea to be line of vegetation on the basis of ancient
tradition, custom, and usage). Hawaiian courts have also developed an indigenous
version of the custom doctrine that extends to beachfront property and guarantees
the gathering rights of Native Hawaiians. See Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v.
Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (affirming ruling that
agencies approving development permit must determine if Native Hawaiian gathering rights have been customarily practiced on the undeveloped land and must explore possibilities to preserve them); see generally Bederman, supra note 3, at 1431
(positing that this decision repudiated the English common law doctrine of custom
in favor of an indigenous construction of the doctrine); Paul Sullivan, Traditional
and Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in
Hawaii, 20 U. HAw. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999); Laura C. Harris, Note, Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission: Expanding Hawaii's
Doctrine of Custom, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 293 (1997).
11 See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 3, at 1417, 1447-55 (calling Oregon's use of the
custom doctrine "an extraordinary streak of judicial activism, self-consciously implementing instrumental changes in the state's property law"); Neal E. Pirkle, Comment, Maintaining Public Access to Texas Coastal Beaches: The Past and the Future,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1093, 1103-04 (1994) (accusing the Oregon Supreme Court of
having greatly altered the custom doctrine by substantially reducing the time needed
to meet the antiquity requirement). The dissent of Justices Scalia and O'Connor to
the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994),
criticized the Oregon Supreme Court's application of custom as inconsistent with the
requirement under English common law that a custom benefit only inhabitants of
particular districts rather than the public at large. See id. at 1212 n.5.
12 See infra Part III for an overview of the takings doctrine as applied to Oregon
beaches.
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sufficiently embedded in Oregon's history and case law as prece-

dent to withstand reconsideration of the doctrine and to constitute a background principle of state law for purposes of the
takings doctrine. With these assumptions, the Article examines
the largely ignored relationship between the rights of the public,

3

as the holder of a recreational easement established by cus-

tom, and the often-competing rights and interests of the dry sand
owner.

THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC'S CUSTOMARY RIGHTS
ON OREGON BEACHES

A.

Equivalency of Custom Rights and Easements

In the landmark litigation of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,4
the trial court had concluded that the public acquired an easement in the dry sand area for recreational purposes. The Oregon

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court by using the English doctrine of custom to establish, presumably, the same right to use
the dry sand area for public recreational purposes as would exist
under a prescriptive easement.1 5 In a subsequent decision, the
Oregon Supreme Court described Thornton as having estab13 Pursuant to Oregon's so-called "Beach Bill," the public's beach rights or easements are declared vested in the State of Oregon and are administered as state recreation areas. See OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610 (1997).

14 See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 587, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).
15 Id. at 594-98, 462 P.2d at 676-78. Oregon's Beach Bill, which preceded the
Thornton decision, provides that where public use has been sufficient to create easements in the public "through dedication, prescription, grant or otherwise," those
rights shall be vested in the State of Oregon as state recreation areas. OR. REV.
STAT. § 390.610 (1997) (amended in 1969 to provide, among other things, that public
use may establish "rights" as well as easements). This legislation created no affirmative rights and was dependent on litigation like the Thornton case to confirm the
existence of any such public rights. See McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 355,
780 P.2d 714, 721 (1989) (stating that nothing in the Beach Bill suggests that the
legislature intended to acquire any interest not already vested in the public). See
generally Lew E. Delo, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law:
State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L. 383, 409 (1974) (reporting that fear of an
unconstitutional taking led the legislature to change the wording of the initial Beach
Bill that would have established public rights in a dry sand area). The Beach Bill,
however, is often falsely credited with establishing the public's recreational easement rights in Oregon beaches. See, e.g., BONNIE HENDERSON, EXPLORING THE
WILD OREGON COAST 70-71 (1994) (maintaining that the Beach Bill recognized that

the public had established its right to use the beach in Oregon); TERENCE
O'DONNELL, CANNON BEACH: A PLACE BY THE SEA

106 (1996) (positing that the

Beach Bill was introduced out of fear that Oregon beaches would otherwisc be lost
to the public).
HeinOnline -- 77 Or. L. Rev. 916 1998
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lished an "easement" in favor of the public for recreational purposes.' 6 Much of this Article's analysis, therefore, will assume

that the public's custom rights in Oregon are in the nature of an
easement, particularly one acquired by prescription. Although it

is possible that issues of landowner and easement-holder rights
and responsibilities will be resolved differently under the com-

mon law custom doctrine than under the common law of easements, this is unlikely because the English doctrine of custom
treats rights acquired by custom as quasi-easements. 17 Being
mindful of the dissent to the petition for certiorari in Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach, in which Justice Scalia accused the Ore-

gon Supreme Court of creating the custom doctrine rather than
describing it,' 8 Oregon's doctrine of custom may be sui generisdistinct from both the common law of easements and the English
doctrine of custom.' 9 But given the similarity of rights acquired

by custom and those acquired by prescription,2" Oregon courts
most likely will apply the law of easements, at least as highly per-

suasive authority, to issues involving the relative rights and responsibilities of the dry sand owner (as holder of the servient
estate) and the public. 2 '
16 See State Highway Comm'n v. Fultz, 261 Or. 289, 491 P.2d 1171, 1172 (1971).
17 See 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
429 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, ed., 4th ed. 1975) (noting that custom rights are analogous to easements but
are not strictly grants of easement because easements must be granted to specific
persons; custom, by contrast, is shared by beneficiaries whose membership is continually changing and fluctuating in number).

18 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J.
and O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
19 See supra note 10 for discussion of the evolution in Hawai'i of an indigenous
custom doctrine.
20 Existing Oregon case law does recognize some differences between easements
acquired by prescription and those by custom. As stated by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Thornton, prescription applies only to the specific tract of land before the
court; in contrast, custom can be established with regard to a larger region. State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969). Custom requires a
showing of antiquity extending beyond Oregon's prescriptive period of 10 years. See
id. at 677 (recognizing that public use of the beach in Thornton extended beyond 60
years). Another significant distinction also derives from the Thornton case. The
landowners argued that their consent to the public's beach use precluded application
of the doctrine of prescriptive easements. The court viewed landowner consent to
Oregon beach-goers, however, as "wholly consistent" with the establishment of
rights by custom. Id. at 678. See generally Delo, supra note 15, at 410. Note that
these differences relate to the means of acquiring rights rather than to the nature
and exercise of the rights once acquired.
21 In some instances the relationship between the beach owner and the public is
controlled by Oregon statute or regulation. For example, see infra Part II.B.6 for a
discussion of regulation of landowner and public rights to extract beach materials.
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Spatial Parameters of Customary Easement Rights

Although the Thornton litigation involved only the dry sand

area fronting the Surfsand Motel in Cannon Beach, Oregon, language in the Oregon Supreme Court's decision (particularly the
policy it expressed that oceanfront lands from border-to-border

"ought to be treated uniformly"22 ) and the court's preference for
custom over the parcel-specific doctrine of easements by prescription support the existence of the customary easement on all
Oregon beaches.23 In McDonald v. Halvorson,24 however, the
Oregon Supreme Court construed Thornton to speak only to
those beaches that abut the ocean 25 and that have histories of
public use like "the Cannon Beach area.",26 Although the Cannon Beach area is a "classic, dry-sand beach, ' 27 under McDonald, the public's beach easement extends to gravel and boulder
beaches 28 and other areas adjacent to the foreshore so long as
they have the requisite similar history of public recreational
use.29 Following McDonald, dry sand owners who can establish
22 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676.
23 In litigation involving a privately owned sand dune east (landward) of the vegetation line in Cannon Beach, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that the state failed to establish public rights under the prescriptive easement, implied dedication, and custom doctrines. See State Highway Comm'n v.
Bauman, 16 Or. App. 275, 517 P.2d 1202 (1974).
24 308 Or. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989).
25 Thornton's establishment of custom, therefore, may not extend to beaches that
abut coastal creeks, rivers, and bays, or to beaches on the bayside of ocean-fronting
sand spits.
26 McDonald, 308 Or. at 357-58, 780 P.2d at 723-24. The McDonald litigation
involved the beach area surrounding Little Whale Cove, a unique freshwater pool
formed adjacent to the ocean's edge by a rock formation that prevents the discharge
of two freshwater streams directly into the ocean. Ocean water enters the cove only
during storms or extreme high tides. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment denying any public right of recreational use on the narrow beach
along the cove. The court reasoned that this beach did not abut the ocean, nor was
there any showing of customary use of this beach. Rather, there was evidence that
for many years beach-goers there were treated as trespassers. Id. at 724. See generally Jo Anne C. Long, Note, McDonald v. Halvorson: Oregon's Beach Access Law
Revisited, 20 ENVTL. L. 1001 (1990). Promotional materials for residential subdivision sales at Little Whale Cove represent that all properties and amenities are private, including the only private beach in Oregon. See SITE PLAN, LITTLE WHALE

COVE (on file with Oregon Law Review); Videotape, Little Whale Cove at Depoe
Bay, Oregon (on file with Oregon Law Review).
27 McDonald, 308 Or. at 359, 780 P.2d at 724.
28 This extension is especially of benefit to the public given the potential in strong
El Nifio or La Nifia cycles for dry sand beaches to erode to beaches of gravel and
boulders.
29 McDonald, 308 Or. at 359, 780 P.2d at 724. See Stevens . City of Cannon
HeinOnline -- 77 Or. L. Rev. 918 1998
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that their beach has little or no history of public use may hold
their title free of the public's easement.
C. Relocating the Recreational Easement on Shifting Sands
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Thornton addressed

public rights in the dry sand area, which it defined as the land
between the mean high tide and the visible line of vegetation.3 °

Globally, most seashores are advancing inland, perhaps as a result of the phenomenon of global warming. 3' Should Oregon's
coastline, as marked by the line of vegetation, advance landward,
will the public's recreational easement follow?3 2 Or must the
public again establish its right to recreate on newly created dry
sand beaches under the doctrine of custom (by demonstrating
Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1210 n.2 (1994) (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (observing that while McDonald generally narrowed Thornton
with regard to the scope of custom, in this respect McDonald seemingly expanded
the reach of custom).
30 State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 586, 462 P.2d 671, 672-73 (1969)
(noting that Oregon legislation refers to the ordinary high-tide line and other
sources to the mean high-tide line and stating that for purposes of the Thornton
litigation the lines would be considered the same). For purposes of the 1969 Beach
Bill that requires, among other things, a special permit for beach improvements,
Oregon law maps out the location of the line of vegetation using a coordinate system. See OR. REV. STAT. § 390.770 (1997) (specifying location of the vegetation line

under the Oregon Coordinate System that replaced the topographic boundary under
the 1967 Beach Bill), id. § 390.760 (describing certain land located above the 16-foot
elevation line but seaward of the line in OR. REV. STAT. § 390.770 that is excepted
from the requirement of a special permit for beach improvements). See infra note
121 and accompanying text for discussion of the statutory improvement permit.
31 See 16 U.S.C. § 1451L (1998) (finding of Congress that coastal states must anticipate that global warming may result in substantial sea level rise); see generally
KOMAR, supra note 4, at 23-24 (asserting that as a result of uplifting plate movement, the sea level at Oregon coast either is not rising or rising less rapidly than on
the East and Gulf Coasts, but noting the uncertainty presented by global warming);
LENA LENCEK AND GIDEON BOSKER, THE BEACH: THE HISTORY OF PARADISE ON

EARTH 277 (1998).

32 If the gradual advance of the ocean were to submerge the beach owner's land,
the state would acquire title to that submerged tideland. See Wilson v. Shiveley, 11
Or. 215, 4 P. 324 (1884). Title to the wet sand area is thus ambulatory and moves
inward with the encroaching ocean. See also Lechuza Villas West v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding the boundary between private beach property and state's tidelands, being the mean high tide line,
ambulatory, not fixed), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 163 (1998); Matcha v. Mattox, 711
S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. App. 1986) writ refd n.r.e. (Nov. 19, 1986). cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1024 (1987) (stating that mean high tide boundary between privately owned beachfront and state-owned tidal waters migrates as the beach moves). Cf. Bergh v.
Hines, 692 N.E.2d 980 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (declaring it well-settled that express
easements stated to run along shoreline boundaries are not fixed and will follow the
naturally changing shoreline).
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longstanding use of that new beach area), under the related doctrines of prescription, dedication, public trust,33 or by purchase?
If so, these doctrines would now collide with an Oregon statute
intended to eliminate actions for acquisition of public rights on
private land made available for recreational use.3 4
Given the requirement under the custom doctrine of ancient
use so long that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, ' 35 a custom of recreational use might not automatically extend landward to newly created beach area.36 However,
authority under the English doctrine of custom supports the
"rolling" nature of a shore-front easement, at least in an analogous context in which the ocean had receded and the custom involved drying nets at the water's edge.3 7 More recently, a Texas
appellate court has held that customary public beach rights are
subject to relocation when the line of vegetation advances landward, in that case due to a hurricane:
33 One of the concurring judges in the Thornton litigation would have grounded
the public's rights to recreate in the public trust doctrine rather than under custom.
See Thornton, 254 Or. at 599, 462 P.2d at 678 (Denecke, J., concurring). Some commentators have advocated use of the public trust doctrine over custom in establishing and maintaining public beach rights. See, e.g., Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public
Access to Coastal Public Property:JudicialTheories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 627, 677 (1989); Richard G. Hildreth, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal
and Ocean Resources Management, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LrriG. 221 (1993). The public
trust doctrine appears to provide the greatest flexibility in relocating the public's
rights in relation to shifting beaches. Cf. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) in which the court stated:
Precisely what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and required to satisfy the public's rights under the public trust doctrine will depend on the circumstances. Location of the dry sand area in relation to the
foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and usage of the upland sand land by
the owner are all factors to be weighed and considered in fixing the contours of the usage of the upper sand.
34 See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.692 (1997) (providing that an owner who directly or

indirectly permits any person to use land for recreational purposes neither gives that
person a right to continued use without the owner's consent nor creates a presumption that the owner intended to dedicate the land; also providing that this law does
not diminish public rights to use land for recreational purposes acquired by dedication, prescription, grant, custom, or otherwise existing before October 3, 1979).
35 Thornton, 254 Or. at 596, 462 P.2d at 677.
36

See

WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN

H.

PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE

MOV-

ING: THE DROWNING OF AMERICA'S SHORELINE 248-49 (1979) (questioning whether

existing beach rights acquired under the doctrines of prescriptive easement, dedication, or custom will extend to beaches formed behind a vegetation line advancing
landward).
37 See Mercer v. Denne, 2 Ch. 538 (1905). See generally Finnell, supra note 33, at
651-53 (1989).
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[Tihe theory of a migratory public easement is compatible
with the doctrine of custom and the situations that often give
rise to a custom. A public easement on a beach cannot have
been established with reference to a set of static lines on the
beach, since the beach itself, and hence public use of it, surely
fluctuated landward and seaward over time. The public easement, if it is to reflect the reality of the public's actual use of
the beach,
38 must migrate as did the customary use from which
it arose.
However, whether Oregon courts will adopt the "rolling" easement approach is unclear. In McDonald v. Halvorson, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Thornton spoke only about
those coastal areas with "histories of use like the Cannon Beach
area."3 9 Would a new beach located landward of the previous
vegetation line have this requisite history of public use?
Moreover, the "rolling" easement approach becomes even
more problematic when the public's easement is claimed to have
rolled past the beach owner's improvements, now located seaward of the vegetation line. In Matcha v. Mattox, a Texas appellate court affirmed an injunction that ordered the removal of a
storm-damaged house that had been crossed by the landward
movement of the vegetation line during a hurricane.4" A Texas
federal district court judge, however, while recognizing the rolling nature of beach easements there, held later that forcing the
removal of existing structures would require compensation as a
taking.4 1
Consider the potential for the seaward retreat of the ocean.
When the ocean (as measured by the high-tide line) gradually
recedes and the dry sand area expands seaward, the general rule
is that the dry sand owner will gain title to this new beach.42
Whether the public's recreational rights attach to the new beach
or remain landward also depends on whether Oregon courts
38 Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. 1986) writ refd n.r.e. (Nov.

19, 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987). Cf. Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106,
113 (Tex. App. 1986) writ refd n.r.e. (Jan. 14, 1987), reh'g of writ of error overruled

(Feb. 18, 1987) (concluding that public recreation rights established on Texas
beaches through implied dedication shift with the changing vegetation line).
39 McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 358, 780 P.2d 714, 723 (1989).
40
Matcha, 711 S.W.2d 95.

41 See Hirtz v. Texas, 773 F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Tex. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 974 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1992).

42 State v. Sause, 217 Or. 52, 80, 342 P.2d 803, 817 (1959) (stating the rule that if
the change is gradual, the boundary of the upland will follow the water; if the change
is sudden (known as avulsion), the boundary stays unchanged).
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adopt the "rolling" easement concept. Many of the same considerations apply as when the beach advances landward. Support-

ing the "rolling" easement is a notable English custom case
holding that the coastal custom of drying fishing nets followed
the receding shoreline.4 3 In the case of the ocean's retreat, the

rights of the private owner to maintain existing improvements on
the uplands property would not be jeopardized. Moreover, because the public historically has recreated in the wet sand area,

movement of the beach seaward may not present a problem
under the McDonald v. Halvorson standard.
A related scenario would involve movement of the vegetation
line seaward across the former dry sand area. The issue here
would be whether the public's recreational rights in the former
dry sand area, once crossed by the vegetation line, would be
lost.44 Under the standard in McDonald v. Halvorson, the history of public use of what was once beach property supports the
continuance of the public's easement rights. But the concept of a
"rolling" beach easement, if adopted by Oregon courts, would
yield a rule under which the public's easement would attach to
the dry sand area and move landward or seaward depending on
coastal forces.4 5 Given the tendency in recent times for seas to
43

Mercer v. Denne, 2 Ch. 538 (1905).

44 The overlay of public regulation in Oregon of the dry sand area, which is de-

fined on the upland side by the vegetation line, would present a related but separate
issue. The State Parks.and Recreation Department is authorized to recommend adjustment of the vegetation line to the legislature. OR. REV. STAT. § 390.755 (1997).
If the legislature were to adjust the line seaward, the new uplands would be removed
from statutory regulation of the dry sand, including the statutory restrictions on new
structures. See infra Part II.B.3. However, unless the Oregon courts extinguish the
public's recreational easement under the "rolling" easement concept, the public
could still retain rights in the uplands property to be governed by the judicial principles of easement law discussed infra Part ll.B. See generally Guillermo M. Diaz,
Analysis of Coastal Changes Along the New River Spit, Bandon Littoral Cell, Relevant to an Adjustment of the Statutory Vegetation Line on the South Coast of Oregon (Master's thesis, Oregon State University (Corvallis)) (on file with Oregon State
University Library) (reporting that beachfront owners near Bandon, Oregon have
requested a seaward relocation of the statutory vegetation line to reflect the growth
of beach on their spit).
45

The

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES)

§ 4.8(3) (Tentative

Draft No. 4, Apr. 5, 1994) enables the holder of the servient estate to make reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an easement to permit normal use of
the servient estate where those changes "(a) do not significantly lessen the utility of
the servitude, or (b) increase the burdens on the holder of the servitude benefit, or
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the servitude was created .... Arguably, these
standards would be satisfied if the beach grew seaward by an amount equal to the
moving vegetation line, and if that beach movement were at least semni-pCrmanent.
HeinOnline -- 77 Or. L. Rev. 922 1998

Castles in the Sand

rise and to claim existing beaches, this "rolling" easement con46
cept seems prospectively to favor the public's interest.

II
THE DRY SAND OWNER'S "BUNDLE OF STICKS"

The following discussion assumes both that the private landowner's title encompasses the dry sand area and that the public
has a customary easement in that beach for recreational purposes. It also assumes that principles of easement law will control the relationship of these parties. With these assumptions, it
explores the relative rights and responsibilities of the beach
owner and the beach-going public.
A.

Balancing Public and Private Interests

Under Oregon easement law, the rights of the easement holder
and of the landowner "are limited, each by the other, so that
there may be reasonable use by both."4 7 As provided in the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.9, the landowner
is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not
unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of the easement for
its intended purpose.48 Applied to the dry sand area, this standard would contemplate a balancing of the interests of the beach
owner in the profitable use of her land and those of the recreating public to ensure a safe and aesthetically pleasing experience.4 9 For example, these interests may balance in favor of
46 See KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 36, at 250 (reaching this conclusion); see
also James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279
(1998) (suggesting rolling easements as a means of protecting tidelands from
development).
47 Miller v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 48 Or. App. 1007, 1016, 618 P.2d 992, 996
(1980).
48 Oregon courts have adopted this standard. See, e.g., Ericsson v. Braukman, 111
Or. App. 57, 62, 824 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1992) ("The owner of the servient estate may
use the area subject to an easement, if that use does not unreasonably interfere with
the easement owner's rights."). The Florida Supreme Court has applied this standard specifically in the context of beach rights by construing the doctrines of custom
and of prescriptive easement to allow the beach owner to make any use of the beach
consistent with the public's recreation rights. See City of Daytona Beach v. TonaRama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974) (concluding that an observation tower erected
in a dry sand area was consistent with public recreational use). See further discussion of Tona-Rama infra Part II.B.3.
49 Cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 390.655 (1997) (articulating standards for improvements
to ocean shore and other property regulated by State Parks and Recreation Department that include the public need for "healthful, safe, esthetic surroundings and
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allowing the landowner to remove newly created sand dunes to
preserve property views, or to prevent inundation of uplands
property, where removal does not sacrifice the public's beach experience.50 In contrast, safety was one factor that tipped the balance in favor of the public's interest, leading the Oregon
Supreme Court to halt construction of a private road on the
beach that would jeopardize the public's escape from tidal waters.5 1 Seawalls often will impair the aesthetic beauty of the
beach,5 2 potentially resulting in the displacement of sand and
thereby reducing the amount of beach available for public recreation.5 3 Structures built on the dry sand would also reduce the
beach area available for public use, whereas certain improvements (e.g., an observation tower) might facilitate public
recreation.5 4
Professor Marc Poirier has argued that through federal flood
insurance and other means the public is subsidizing private
beachfront development.55 From this conclusion he argues that
beachfront development restrictions should be upheld against
takings challenges. It follows that one of the factors to be considered in balancing landowner and public beach rights is the extent
of such public subsidies and the potential for destruction of the
conditions"); OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0005 to -0030 (1997) (elaborating on these
standards). Supporting the public's side of the balance is research by Professor
Carol Rose who documented the virtues of public access and socialization in concluding that doctrines such as custom that provide public access to certain locations
are "as important as the general privatization of property in other spheres of our
law." Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 781 (1986).

50 See infra Part II.B.6. Of course, other factors would be relevant in any such
determination, such as the extent to which the sand dunes prevent beach erosion.
51 See infra Part II.B.3. One of the factors cited by the Oregon Department of
Parks and Recreation in denying the permit for the seawall leading to the litigation
in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1207 (1994), was that the seawall would pose an escape route obstacle to
beach users fleeing the surf. Id. at 134 n.4, 854 P.2d at 451 n.4.
52 For illustrations of the visual impacts of seawalls on the Oregon coast see
KOMAR, supra note 4, at 181-83.
53 See generally James W. Good, Ocean Shore Protection Policy & Practices in
Oregon: An Evaluation of Implementation Success (1992) (Ph.D. dissertation, Oregon State University (Corvallis)) (documenting effects of seawalls in Oregon on
sediment supply); see also Carmel Finley, Engineer Proposes Lincoln City Seawall
Plan, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), June 10, 1996, at B1 (remarks of state official

that seawalls decrease beach sand supply).
54 See infra Part II.B.3.
55 See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the
Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (993).
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desired shorefront improvements. From this perspective, a seawall might be urged on the basis that its use will preserve upland
improvements.5 6
McDonald v. Halvorson articulated a standard for recognizing
public custom rights on beaches that have a history of public use
like "the Cannon Beach area."5 7 As part of the balancing of the
rights of the public against those of the dry sand owner on
beaches impressed with custom, it may be relevant to examine
more particularly the current and potential future public use of
the specific beach in controversy. If the beach lies in a sparsely
populated area and is subject to substantially less foot traffic than
beaches within municipal boundaries, it may be reasonable to allow the landowner certain uses that would infringe too severely
on public rights to be permissible on more trafficked beaches.
Another balancing factor, though more properly the subject of
consensual bargains than for courts in litigation, is any agreement
between the beach owner and the public to exchange rights. For
example, a landowner seeking a permit to develop an uplands
structure that will encroach somewhat onto the beach might persuade government officials that a consensual grant of public
beach access through the uplands property (in the form of an
easement) outweighs the displacement of beach by the proposed
structure.5 s
B.

Examining the Landowner's "Bundle of Sticks"

The Oregon Supreme Court speculated in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay that "one explanation for the evolution of the custom
[in Oregon] of the public to use the dry-sand area for recreational purposes is that the area could not be used conveniently by
its owners for any other purpose."5 9 In fact, the beach has value
and purpose for the dry sand owner beyond recreation. Whether
these uses remain in the Oregon beach owner's "bundle of
sticks" is the subject of the discussion below.
56 But see Titus, supra note 46, at 1332 (stating that private seawalls generally are
unable to withstand a severe storm). One of the factors cited by the Oregon Department of Parks and Recreation in denying the seawall permit in the Stevens litigation
was that the proposed design failed to protect the uplands property against wave
overtopping and the 100-year flood. Stevens, 317 Or. at 134 n.4, 854 P.2d at 451 n.4.
57 McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 358, 780 P.2d 714, 723 (1989).
58 Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning a
building permit for uplands residence on the landowner's involuntary grant of public
access easement across uplands to beach held a taking).
59 State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588-89, 462 P.2d 671, 673-74 (1969).
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No Right to Exclude

The most fundamental of property rights, the right to exclude
others,6 ° generally is missing from the beach owner's "bundle of
sticks." Thornton involved the state's successful action to enjoin

the owners of an oceanfront motel from fencing in the dry sand
to create a private beach for motel guests only.61 The essence,
then, of the relationship between the beach owner and the public
as holder of a recreational easement is the loss of the landowner's right to exclude the recreating public from the dry sand

area. In contrast to California, where some landowners "tak[e]
tickets and charg[e] admission to their beaches,
are no private beaches in Oregon.63

62

to date there

The beach can be a dangerous place, especially during winter
storms when storm surges and tidal waters often inundate the
otherwise dry sand area. Having lost the right to exclude
beachgoers under the custom doctrine, must beach owners take
precautions to ensure the safety of beachgoers, or at least to
warn them of hazards? An Oregon statute relieves the beach
owner, and other owners of property used for recreation purposes, from such liability. 64
As stated above, the general standard in easement law permits
reasonable use by both the landowner and the easement
60 Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 ("We have repeatedly held that, as to property
reserved by its owner for private use, the right to exclude [others is] one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
61

See

BRENT WALTH, FIRE AT EDEN'S GATE: TOM MCCALL & THE OREGON

STORY 187-92 (1994) (describing the erection by the Hays in 1966 of a fence running
to the high-tide line that enclosed tables and cabanas for guests as well as a sign
reading "Surfsand [Motel] Guests Only").
62 Larry Bacon, Whose Beach Is It, Anyway?, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, Aug. 2,
1992, at D1 (remarks of state attorney in the litigation of Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach).
63 Promotional materials for Little Whale Cove, the subject of litigation in McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989), advertise the only private
beach on the Oregon coast. See SITE PLAN, LITTLE WHALE COVE (on file with
Oregon Law Review), Videotape: Little Whale Cove at Depoe Bay, Oregon (on file
with Oregon Law Review).
64 See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682 (1997) (owner not liable in contract or tort for
any personal injury, death, or property damage arising out of use of land for public
recreation purposes); id. § 105.688 (this immunity extends to lands adjacent to the
ocean shore, but is unavailable if the landowner charges for use. Therefore, the
immunity may not protect the landowner who sells permission to a non-owner to
extract beach materiak; see ina Part I1.B.6).
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holder.6 5 Presumably, then, the beach owner retains the right to

exclude unreasonable uses of her beach by the public. Under the
common law of easements, misuse of an easement is subject to
injunction.6 6 In the unlikely event that the court cannot fashion

an injunction to prevent the damaging use, the easement may be
forfeited.6 7 Reasonableness of use of an easement will depend

on the circumstances of each case.68 In the context of a beach
easement, it is unclear whether sustained or episodic vandalism
(particularly of the beach owner's adjoining uplands property),
littering,69 disturbing the peace, unlawful burning, discharge of
illegal fireworks, public nudity, violence, or criminal activity con-

stitutes unreasonable use, particularly when the conduct is criminal and other enforcement mechanisms exist.
This standard of reasonableness to protect the landowner
against misuse is related to the standard of reasonableness used

to confirm the custom of Oregon beach recreation in the first
instance. In Thornton, the Oregon Supreme Court had con-

cluded that the English custom requirement of reasonableness
was satisfied by evidence that the public had made appropriate
65 See supra Part II.A.
66 See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
LICENSES IN LAND $ 9.08 (1988); 4 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.20 (1997).
67 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 66, $ 9.08; POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 66,
§ 34.20.
68 Miller v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 48 Or. App. 1007, 1016, 618 P.2d 992, 996
(1980).
69 See Stan Federman, Cannon Beach Motel Owner Fights for Right to Fence Off
Private Beach for Guests, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), May 14, 1967, at 25 (Bill
Hay, co-owner of the Surfsand Motel and the co-defendant in Thornton, had justified his barricading the dry sand in front of his motel because of alleged "constant
public vandalism" on the beach, including leaving behind broken bottles and garbage). When the Thornton decision was announced, then-Governor Tom McCall
described the public responsibilities that would govern use of their recreational
easement:
We must see that the beaches are used in a lawful manner.
We must ensure that property of adjacent landowners is secure from
harm.
We must protect neighboring residents from disorderly behavior by the
few who are found in every group.
And all of us must dedicate ourselves to stopping litter and vandalism in
this splendid recreation area.
Paul Harvey Jr., Public Beach Rights Affirmed, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Dec.
23, 1969, at 1. See also John Griffith, Mess on Beach Prompts State to Respond, THE
OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 11, 1998, at C18 (reports of broken bottles, condoms,
drug paraphernalia, and human waste left behind by holiday beach users on Oregon
beach).
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use of the beach and that municipal police had intervened to prevent inappropriate uses.7 °
In 1986, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a claim by the
same hoteliers from the Thornton litigation who sought to challenge the state's allowance of vehicle parking on their beach as a
nuisance and a trespass. 71 Although the claim may have been
brought more properly as one to enjoin misuse of the public's
easement, the standard for private nuisance applied by the court
looked to the reasonableness of the use in controversy. Thus, it
duplicated the analysis for misuse of an easement. Based on the
history of vehicular traffic on the plaintiffs' beach, public parking
was held reasonable and not a nuisance. 72 Similarly, the longstanding history of vehicular use would validate parking under
the doctrine requiring reasonable use of easements. Because
these related doctrines apply the standard of reasonableness on a
case-by-case basis, however, one cannot state a blanket rule for
Oregon beaches. For example, parking may not be part of the
history of a specific beach, and parking particularly may impact a
beach owner whose uplands property lays so low that
automobiles impair the landowner's view.7 3
Closely related to misuse of the public's beach easement rights
is the potential of a landowner's challenge to excessive public
use. Servient estate owners have often challenged easement
holders who heavily increased their use of the easement, or who,
70 See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 596, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (1969).
For discussion of the English custom reasonableness requirement, see Bederman,
supra note 3, at 1392-95. See also Delo, supra note 15, at 397-98 (observing that
under the English doctrine of custom, reasonableness refers to legal reasonableness
as a policy matter rather than the standard used in Thornton that looked to the
reasonableness of the actual use by those claiming the custom; concluding, however,
that a good argument can be made that the Oregon beach recreation custom satisfies
the English standard).
71 Hay v. Oregon Dep't of Transportation, 301 Or. 129, 719 P.2d 860 (1986).
72 Id. at 142-43, 719 P.2d at 869.
73 Consider the potential adverse impacts on the beach owner of a public highway
or roadway built on beach property. Presumably, this use would interfere unreasonably with the beach owner's recreation rights and upland property values and require compensation to the landowner. Although there is a history of public use of
the beach area for transportation purposes, this use was predominately on the wet
sand area, and Oregon's era of commercial beach travel by horse and auto stages
ended some years ago with the opening of the Oregon Coast Highway and other
transportation advances. See generally Gary Meier, When the Highway Was Sand,
10 OREGON COAST MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 26. Moreover, the sandy beach
remained open for recreational use and scenic view between infrequent coaches, as
upposed to the obstruction nnrsphalt road would pose. Id.
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through developments in technology or otherwise, changed their
use of the easement, in either case increasing the burden on the
servient estate.74 As in the case of a challenge for misuse (e.g.,
littering an access easement), challenges to excessive use (e.g.,
increased traffic on an access easement resulting from development of the dominant estate) or to changed use (e.g., introducing
vehicles on an easement for rail traffic) will be judged under the
overarching standard of reasonableness. Due to increases in

state and national population, development of tourism infrastructure in coastal communities, and transportation advances, public
use of Oregon beaches has undoubtedly increased since public
recreation rights were recognized in 1969 by Thornton.T Still, it
is unlikely that a beach owner would succeed in obtaining restrictions on the extent of beach use by the public.7 6 In most cases,
public use over the years has risen steadily rather than abruptly.
This normal increase in use by the easement holder seems rea-

sonable.77 Moreover, increased use of the beach may inure to
the benefit of commercial uses of uplands property such as hotels
and restaurants. That benefit, in turn, has enhanced the property
values of residential owners of uplands property.
In Thornton, the Oregon Supreme Court spoke of the public's
historical recreational use of the dry sand area "for picnics, gath-

ering wood, building warming fires, and generally as a headquarters from which to supervise children or to range out over the
foreshore as the tides advance and recede.

'78

Although public

74 See generally 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04(a)(1)(iii) (David A.

Thomas, ed. 1994).

75 See Peter D. Sleeth & Foster Church, Oregon's Crowded Coast, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 7, 1997, at Al (reporting results of poll naming coast as favor-

ite destination for vacationing Oregonians with 57% of Oregonians visiting
regularly; also reporting coastal population boom and increased traffic counts on
Oregon's coastal highway). Cf. Katherine Niven, Beach Access: An Historical Overview, 2 N.Y. SEA GRANT L. & POLICY J. 161, 162-63 (1978) (citing a study in the
1960s that predicted participation in outdoor recreation activities by the year 2000
would be quadruple the 1960 level).
76 One possible argument on behalf of the landowner would be that the increased

public use interferes with the owner's own use of the beach for recreational purposes. Cf. Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d 1153 (Conn. 1981) (opening private beach to
the public would unreasonably interfere with the rights of parties holding an easement to use the beach for bathing purposes).
77 Cf. Logan v. Brodrick, 631 P.2d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that traffic
increase on consensual easement for access to resort due to population growth and
burgeoning public interest in recreation did not unreasonably burden servient

owner).
78 State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).
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use generally is the same today as during the period when the
custom of public recreational use was established, there are some
minor differences (e.g., the introduction of land windsail devices
and all-terrain vehicles), 79 as well as the prospect for future
evolution of recreational beach use. Under the law of easements,
including that of prescriptive easements, courts recognize that
the easement holder may modify her use of the easement, such as
to take advantage of technological advances, so long as the modified use does not unreasonably burden the servient estate. 8° The
English custom doctrine has recognized the same flexibility of
reasonable modification; in the case of a custom to recreate, the
nature of the recreation may vary with the prevailing fashion.81
2.

Right Against Exclusion

The rights of dry sand owners can be described in a sarcastic
tone by pointing out they at least retain the right to use the beach
with the rest of the public. In fact, there is more substance to this
right than first appears.8 2 Among other things, the public should
be unable to erect any structure that would unreasonably burden,
rather than advance, the dry sand owner's beneficial use of her
79 Cf. OR. ADMIN. R. 736-030-0030 (1998) (prohibiting windsails on Cannon
Beach and Seaside beaches).
80 See, e.g., Firebaugh v. Boring, 288 Or. 607, 618, 607 P.2d 155, 161 (1980):
[I]n determining whether a particular use of a prescriptive easement is permissible, a comparison should be made between (A) the use by which the
easement was created, and (B) the proposed use considering these factors:
(1) the relative burdens upon the servient tenement; (2) the nature and
character of the uses of the easement; and (3) the purposes achieved
through the uses of the easement.
For easements created by express grant, as opposed to those obtained by prescription, the court will also consider the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Bernards v. Link,
199 Or. 579, 248 P.2d 341 (1952) (construing grant of right-of-way for hauling logs to
allow the easement holder to keep abreast of "developments of the times" and con-

vert from trains to logging trucks). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), supra note 45, § 4.10 (allowing the manner, frequency, and
intensity of easement use to change to take advantage of technology developments
and to accommodate normal development so long as the change does not cause
unreasonable damage to or interfere unreasonably with enjoyment of the servient

estate);

BRUCE

& ELY, supra note 66, $ 7.05;

POWELL

& ROHAN, supra note 66,

§ 34.13 (stating that uses that have no connection with or resemblance to the adverse
use by which a prescriptive easement was created are not permissible).
81 See 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 17, $[ 425, 434. But cf.
Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821) (rejecting the expansion of
custom to use shorelands for fishing to include bringing horse-drawn bathing machines (a portable bath-house device) across the beach).
82 For example, the public could not sell to one beach landowner the right to establish a private beach on a neighboring owner's beach property.
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beach. For example, public restrooms would serve little purpose

for a beach owner with such facilities in an adjoining residence or
motel. In contrast, picnic and sports amenities could benefit the
beach owner equally with the public.8 3 Consider finally the ex-

ample of permanent or semi-permanent camping structures such
as "yurts." Again, in all likelihood these would not benefit a
beach owner with adjoining overnight facilities, and, in fact, actu-

ally might compete with them.
In addition to their potential to interfere with the beach
owner's use of the dry sand, public structures on the beach may
impair the value of uplands development. These additions might
unreasonably impair the scenic view rights through the beach
that the dry sand owner should enjoy.8 4

Oregon's custom doctrine ensures the public's right to use the
dry sand beaches for recreational purposes. It does not, how-

ever, provide access rights through adjoining uplands property
titled in the dry sand owner, at least in the absence of establishment of access rights under the doctrines of prescriptive easements or implied dedication or by eminent domain.8 5 The beach

owner with adjoining uplands property, therefore, enjoys a potential right of convenient beach access not shared by the
public.8 6
One potentially thorny issue involves the question of to what
extent municipal ordinances or other laws that restrict the public's right to use the beach may govern dry sand owners. For example, assume that a municipality adopts a beach curfew
operative during nighttime hours. Could that curfew properly
extend to the beach owner on her own property?8 7 What about
83 See supra text accompanying notes 44 & 73 for a related discussion of whether
public parking on the beach unreasonably burdens the dry sand owner.
84 Although generally the law does not recognize the establishment of view easements by prescription, e.g., Hill v. The Beach Co., 306 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1983), this
doctrine should have no place in this context of beach owner rights.
85 See Fran Recht, The Coast Isn't Safe, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 6, 1997,

at D5 (lamenting the loss of beach access through private development of uplands).
It is possible that the public trust doctrine, at least as applied in New Jersey, may
serve as a basis for obtaining access rights through uplands property. See Matthews
v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (suggesting that under
the public trust doctrine the public has a right of reasonable access to the sea).
86 Where the beach owner desires to secure access through stairs that will extend
into the dry sand area, presumably the principles discussed in the next section for
construction of structures will apply.
87 Cf. OR. ADMIN. R. 736-030-0020 (1998) (prohibiting overnight camping or
sleeping on the beach in several Oregon coastal communities).
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to guests of a beach owner's adjoining motel operation?
3.

Right to Construct Improvements

Ordinarily, it would seem that improvements constructed by a
landowner on the beach would interfere unreasonably with the
public's easement rights.88 For example, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed an injunction against completion of a road being
constructed on the beach by the dry sand owner-the road would
occupy or enclose over an acre of beach and would impede public escape from tidal waters, as well as result in erosion of the
beach through lateral displacement of sand. 8 9

Some landowner improvements, however, may further the
public's recreational experience and may, on balance, constitute
reasonable uses. For example, the Florida Supreme Court re-

marked that the landowner's erection in the dry sand of a seventeen-foot diameter observation tower "was consistent with the
recreational use of the land by the public and could not interfere
with the exercise of any easement the public may have acquired ...."90 Presumably the landowner planned to charge the
88 These materials focus on the standard under the common law of easements for
construction of improvements by the servient landowner. Oregon law requires that
beach owners obtain a special permit issued by the State Parks and Recreation Department for beach improvements. OR. REv. STAT. § 390.640 (1997). The standards
for such permits include consideration of the "public need for healthful, safe, esthetic surroundings and conditions" as well as the "need for recreation and other
facilities and enterprises in the future development of the area." Id. § 390.655; see
also OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0005 to 0030 (1998) (elaborating on statutory standards). These standards appear to be quite similar to the standard of reasonableness
employed under the common law of easements. The ramifications of this overlay of
statutory regulation on the rules of easement law are discussed infra Part III.
Oregon's Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) has
adopted planning goals for Oregon land planning that encompass its beaches. The
Implementation Requirements for LCDC's Goal 18 require that government prohibit residential developments as well as commercial and industrial buildings on Oregon beaches. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0010 (1998). The Oregon Supreme Court in
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 147, 854 P.2d 449, 459 (1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994), observed that the Implementation Requirement 4 of
LCDC Goal 18 appears to allow for construction of single-family dwellings in the
dry sand area. Goal 18, however, encompasses the dry sand beach as well as dunes
and lands upland of the dry sand. Implementation Requirement 4 exempts singlefamily dwellings from the requirement that government protect groundwater from
drawdown that leads to intrusion of salt water or other adverse effects. It does not
appear to exempt single-family dwellings from the prohibition of residential developments on the beach.
89 See State Highway Commission v. Fultz, 261 Or. 289, 293, 491 P.2d 1171, 1173
(1971).

90 City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Kama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77-78 (Fla. 1974)
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public for admission to this elaborate tower that was to be entered by a rising, rotating gondola in the mode of an amusement
park attraction. Allowing the landowner to erect improvements
to enhance recreation, such as volleyball courts, firepits, and pic-

nic tables, for free public and private use seems reasonable.91
Permitting the dry sand owner to erect more elaborate improvements and to charge admission to recoup investment costs and to

profit seems contrary to the easement rights of the public. Indeed, it could be argued that a private motel on the dry sand area
enhances the beach experience of those who pay to stay there,

but such an improvement would certainly contradict the ruling in
Thornton that involved a mere fence. Oregon courts and regulatory authorities should view proposed beach improvements cautiously and approve only those that both benefit the public and
that are available for public use without charge.

One potential exception to the condition that beach improvements benefit the public is where the infringement on the public's recreation rights, on balance, is very slight in relation to the
utility of the improvement to the beach owner. Examples may
include stairway landings that provide convenient access for the
landowner while displacing only a small amount of the beach,9 2
as well as underground pipelines or conduits that do not alter the
(above statement was dictum as it related to claim of prescriptive beach easement
because court held the public had not acquired an easement by prescription; however, court concluded public had rights in beach by custom and appeared to apply
the same standard in stating that the owner can make any use of the property consistent with the public's custom of recreational use). See generally Case Comment, 2
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 806 (1974).
91 Query whether landscaping the beach would interfere with public recreation.
Cf. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App. 1986) writ ref d n.r.e. (Nov. 19,
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (affirming an injunction against dry sand
owners prohibiting any construction of structures or placement or nourishment of
plants that interfered with public recreation). Because the vegetation line has
served in Oregon as the landward boundary of the public's custom rights, any planting of vegetation on the beach by the landowner could create confusion in ascertaining the location of the public's rights.
92 Consider the potential for the intrusion onto the beach of structural supports
attached to a building that overhangs the beach, or the intrusion of an overhanging
building supported entirely by uplands property. Analogous authority has applied
the easement balancing test to conclude that a walkway 16 feet above an access
easement to connect the servient owner's buildings did not unreasonably interfere
with use of the right of way. See Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d
786 (Minn. 1970). Of course, one purpose of the public's beach easement is an aesthetic component that ordinarily would not play a role in balancing the rights of a
landowner and a holder of an access easement.
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physical characteristics of the beach or pose a safety risk.9 3
4.

Right to Keep Existing Improvements

Before the public's easement rights were articulated in Thornton, improvements were erected in isolated instances on the dry
sand beach in Oregon. These improvements range from buildings to additions appurtenant to buildings, such as seawalls. Responding to the claim of the plaintiffs in the Stevens litigation
that Thornton's establishment of custom could not be applied to
existing beach owners retroactively, the Oregon Supreme Court
stated that Thornton's date-1969-was not relevant. Rather,
the public's easement rights pre-dated the Thornton decision and
''came into being long before" the plaintiffs acquired their beach
property in 1957. 94 Therefore, there undoubtedly are improvements on Oregon beaches that, when erected, violated the public's then-existing easement rights.9 5
Certain of these improvements were erected in the period between adoption of the Beach Bill in 196796 and issuance of the
Thornton decision in 1969. During that time there was great uncertainty over the extent, if any, of the public's rights in the dry
sand beaches.9 7 At minimum, the Beach Bill required the land93 OR. REV. STAT. § 390.715 (1997) requires a permit for pipelines, cable lines,
and other conduits across or under the beach and payment of "just compensation"
by the permittee. See also OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0040 (1998) (detailing considerations for issuance of permits). Presumably, no compensation would be due from the
dry sand owner. When the permittee is someone other than the beach owner, the
statute requires the landowner's consent to issuance of the permit. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 390.715(2) (1997).
Cases arising under easement law have recognized the ability of the servient
owner to construct improvements underneath a right of way in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Reutner v. Vouga, 367 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (servient
owner could construct storm sewer system under roadway easement).
94 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 135, 854 P.2d 449, 452 n.9
(1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994); Appellants' Opening Brief and Abstract
of Oregon at 5, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 Or. App. 457, 835 P.2d 940
(1992), affid, 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993) (stating that the plaintiffs had owned
the lots in controversy since 1957).
95 Some of these structures, on balance, may be consistent with the rights of the
servient estate owner to use the servient land in a manner that does not infringe
unreasonably on the easement holder. The discussion that follows assumes that the
improvement is unreasonable and violated the public's easement rights when
erected.
96 See supra note 15 for a discussion of the Beach Bill.
97 Likely, there was some urgency during this time to develop vacant uplands and
beach property now that the controversy over beach rights had ascended to the foreHeinOnline -- 77 Or. L. Rev. 934 1998
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owner to seek a special permit for beach improvements.9 8 Also

during that period, Oregon's most notable encroachment onto
the dry sand-two ten-story condominium towers in Lincoln City
known as the Inn at Spanish Head-was erected.9 9 To obtain a

permit under the Beach Bill, the condominium project developer
deeded to the state over an acre of beach property for public
use.1"' Although the parties apparently assumed that the public
had no recreational rights in this developer's beach,' 0 ' an assumption likely incorrect in retrospect,' 0 2 conveying fee simple
in part of the beach ought to validate these
rights to the public
3
improvements.

10

front of media attention with the adoption of the Beach Bill in 1967 and the initiation of the Thornton litigation.
98 See supra note 13.
99 There was some uncertainty as to the extent the condominum development
would encroach onto the dry sand. Apparently the buildings themselves were built
behind the 16-foot elevation line under the 1967 Beach Bill, but the seawall built
along the base of the structure ran 30 to 50 feet into the dry sand area. See Lincoln
City Resort Wins Highway Agency Okay, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 18,
1967, at 1. For a photograph of the Inn at Spanish Head as constructed see BERT
WEBBER & MARGIE WEBBER, BAYOCEAN,

THE OREGON TOWN THAT FELL INTO

THE SEA 174 (1989). It is apparent from viewing the condominium resort in person
that part of the building foundation and appurtenances such as staircases and terraces also encroach into the dry sand area as judged by the likely path of the vegetation line.
100 See Resort Wins Highway Agency Okay, supra note 99, at 1. The land donated
was reportedly valued at $25,700, perhaps on the basis of real property tax assessments before recognition of the public's easement rights. Note the permit was approved by the Highway Department, since replaced in this function by the Oregon
Department of Parks and Recreation.
101 See State Studies Roadblock for Beach Resort Plans, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), June 29, 1967, at I1 (reporting comments of developer that it was not going to
raise the question of whether the public had been using the beach there, although
the developer thought it had not been used for 30 to 40 years because a big log
pileup made it hard to reach). See also Beach Use Policy, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Sept. 7, 1967, at 138 (opining in editorial that the Spanish Head resort will
intrude on no usable portion of a log-clogged beach).
102 Given the circumstances in the preceding note, undoubtedly the developer today would argue under McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989),
that the beach was not similarly situated as the beach in the Thornton litigation. See
discussion supra Part I.B. Alternatively, assuming custom rights existed on the
beach, the developer would argue that, on balance, the encroachment did not unreasonably interfere with public rights on a little-used beach.
103 See also Florence Project Owners Donate Beach to Public, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland), March 30, 1968, at 14 (reporting that developers of an oceanfront resort
known as Driftwood Shores had quitclaimed to the state all rights to about 800 feet
of ocean frontage). On the question of the authority of the Highway Department or
other state agency to convey any public recreational easement rights that may have
existed, Oregon statutes authorize agencies to sell public property whenever the
public interest may be furthered. Presumably, this authority extends to the public's
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Uncertainty surrounds those improvements erected subsequent to the public's acquisition of easement rights 10 4 but before
the Thornton decision and for which no conveyance or other special consideration was required as a condition to any building
permit. Presumably, because Thornton was decided some thirty
years ago, the beach owner would claim today that the beach
area on which the improvements were located had reverted fully
to private ownership by adverse possession. Oregon case law,10 5
as well as authority in other states,' 0 6 recognizes the potential for
the servient landowner to extinguish an easement by adverse
possession, such as by erecting permanent structures on the easement,1 07 for the requisite prescriptive period-ten years in Oregon.' 0 8 But under the common law of adverse possession, the
doctrine is not available to establish rights against a government
body. 10 9 Because the public's easement rights in Oregon beaches
are declared vested in the state of Oregon by the Beach Bill," 10
this limitation might prevent a beach owner from claiming adverse possession. Prior to enactment of the Beach Bill in 1967,
however, whether the State of Oregon owned the public's easement rights (in existence "long before" 1957)1. is less certain.
Apart from adverse possession, easements may be lost by
abandonment or by the closely related doctrine of estoppel.
Abandonment, however, requires unequivocal proof of intent to
custom easement. See OR. REV. STAT. § 390.620 (1997) (no portion of ocean shore
can be alienated except as provided by law); id. § 271.310 (1997) (stating that political subdivision may sell property it possesses or controls to the government or to a
private individual or corporation when the property is not needed for public use or
when the public interest may be furthered).
104 Any beach improvements erected before the public acquired easement rights
on Oregon beaches should be free of the public's easement (although perhaps not
the regulatory overlay of the Beach Bill). Here the beach owner could establish
under the McDonald standard that the specific beach land underneath the improvements had no requisite history of public use. See supra Part I.B.
105 See, e.g., Faulconer v. Williams, 327 Or. 381, 964 P.2d 246 (1998) (easement
extinguished by adverse possession); Slak v. Porter, 128 Or. App. 274, 280-82, 875
P.2d 515, 520 (1994) (same result).
106 See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 66, $ 424 (stating that a servient owner
may extinguish an easement by adverse use for the prescriptive period).
107 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 66, 9.07 (citing cases involving buildings and
other obstructions of easements).
108 See OR. REV. STAT. § 12.050 (1997) (limiting action for recovery of possession
of realty to one commenced within 10 years of the loss of possession).
10 9 See 29 OR. Arr'y GEN. Op. 187, 188 (1959) (easement owned by State of
Oregon cannot be lost by adverse possession).
11 0
OR. REX'. STAT. § 390.610 (1997).
111 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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abandon; mere nonuse of an easement (here one obstructed by
an improvement), without more, ordinarily is not conclusive.112
Estoppel involves action by the servient owner to its material
detriment in reliance on conduct of the easement holder. 113 Arguably, the issuance by a municipality or county of a building
permit would constitute an estoppel. 1 4 It is unclear, however,
whether action by some municipality would be attributed to the

public, or to the state as caretaker of the public's easement, for
purposes of an estoppel. Moreover, there is authority in the related context of the public trust doctrine under which no defense
in the nature of latches or estoppel may be asserted against the
state.1 15
Under the English doctrine of custom, an act of Parliament
could extinguish a customary right.1 16 Presumably the Oregon
legislature can act in appropriate circumstances to protect the
landowner's investment expectations in cases of beach development before the public's rights were established firmly in Thornton. Analogously, in order to protect the investments of dozens
of oceanfront homeowners whose homes were traversed by a
long-forgotten cliffside right-of-way t17 that had been platted in
1890 but never built, a coastal county vacated the road in 1998."'8
Another similar situation involves forces of nature that relocate
See Connor v. Lucas, 141 Or. App. 531, 920 P.2d 171 (1996); see generally 7
supra note 74, § 60.08(b)(3)(i) (nonuse must be accompanied by affirmative and unequivocal acts indicating intent to abandon). See also BRUCE & ELY,
supra note 66, 9.05[2] (criticizing approach of some states that recognize an exception under which easements acquired by prescription are terminated by nonuse of
the easement for the period of prescription).
113 See generally BRUCE & ELY, supra note 66,
9.05[2]; 7 THOMPSON, supra note
74, § 60.08(b)(4); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES), supra note
45, § 7.6 (providing rule for modification or extinguishment of easement by
estoppel).
114 Cf. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 66, T 9.06[2] ("One circumstance calling for
application of the [estoppel] doctrine arises when the owner of a servient estate,
acting on authorization from the easement holder, constructs a substantial improvement that obstructs the easement."). Another possible factor supporting an estoppel
could be the assessment and collection of real property taxes on the improvements.
115 See Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board, 250 Or. 319, 439 P.2d
575 (1968) (holding that a defense of latches was not available in an ejectment action
by the state against a sand and gravel company using land underlying a navigable
river).
1 16
See 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 17, 441.
117 The controversy apparently involved only uplands property and not the dry
sand
beach.
1 18
See John Griffith, Unbuilt Road Becomes Issue in Yachats, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland), Feb. 12, 1998, at D2.
112

THOMPSON,
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the beach landward of existing improvements.1 19 Here, however,
a Texas appellate court affirmed an order to remove a building in
circumstances arguably more compelling than our landowner
who built before Oregon's custom doctrine was announced. 2 °
5. Right to Construct Protective Structures
Consistent with the standard that balances the interests of the
landowner and the easement holder, structures such as seawalls
vital to protect existing or planned improvements on uplands
property may be permissible in certain circumstances. For example, the protective structure might be sought on a beach that is
used by the public only sporadically. Other relevant factors may
include the extent of dry sand area displaced by the structure,
whether the structure jeopardizes public escape from wave action, whether existing uplands structures are imperiled by erosion and the immediacy of that threat,1 21 and the extent to which
the appearance of the structure detracts from the aesthetic experience of the beach-going public.
One reading of the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach 122 is that beach owners have no
property right to construct protective structures and that they derive any such right solely from Oregon law that allows these
structures only in specified circumstances where uplands devel119 See supra Part I.C.
120 Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 97, 101 (Tex. App. 1986) writ reJ'd n.r.e.
(Jan. 14, 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (affirming judgment ordering landowner to remove beach house and other obstructions to public's use of relocated
beach). Consider the rules that would apply if an encroaching project such as the
Inn at Spanish Head were to be destroyed by natural forces or otherwise. Presumably, a special beach improvement permit allowing the repair or reconstruction would
be required from the State Parks and Recreation Department. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 390.650(5) (1997) (exempting applications for beach improvement permits from
the potential for a public hearing when the permit is to repair or replace a building
that existed before the Beach Bill took effect in 1967).
121 ORS 390.650 (1997), which specifies the procedure for issuance of a permit for
beach improvements such as seawalls, authorizes an emergency permit where property or property boundaries are in imminent peril of being destroyed by wave action;
the emergency permit may be issued without a public hearing and without adherence to standards articulated in ORS 390.655 that require consideration of the public
need for recreation and other factors of public interest.
122 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993) (affirming the dismissal of an inverse condemnation action brought by beach owners who were denied a permit to build a seawall
in furtherance of intended development of their uplands property for hotel pur.F aeic'a,
OSeS,
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opment existed on January 1, 1977.123 That reading is inconsis-

tent with the common law of easements which considers a
proposed use by the servient owner on a case-by-case basis and

balances the necessity of the proposed use against its intrusion on
enjoyment by the easement holder. If this easement standard is

applied to beach protective structures, then grounds may exist
for takings challenges arising out of the denial of permits for
their construction, even for uplands property not developed
before 1977.124 Under the standard for takings articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'2 5 prohibiting construction might be seen as depriving the upland property of all

economically beneficial use. Because the background principle
of custom would not necessarily deprive the landowner of the

right to construct the seawall, the custom doctrine would not save
Oregon's outright prohibition of certain protective structures
from being compensable on its face. 126 Regarding protective
structures sought for land developed before 1977, a different
analysis applies that still holds the potential for a regulatory taking. Roughly, the existing regulatory considerations for approval
of such structures 127 are similar to what a court would consider
under the easement standard of balancing. Should those regulatory standards be misapplied, a taking could result.
6.

Right to Remove or to ProhibitRemoval of Beach Materials
The collection and removal of beach materials holds value that

123 See Stevens, 317 Or. at 143, 854 P.2d at 457 (holding that because of the custom doctrine the plaintiffs never owned the property interests they claimed were
taken by the denial of a permit to construct a protective structure); see also OR.
ADMIN. R. 736-020-0010(6) (1998) (in accordance with LCDC Goal 18, permit applications for beachfront protective structures will be considered only where development existed on January 1, 1977).
124 See infra Part 1II.
125 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
126 See id. at 1015 (recognizing at least two categories of regulatory action as compensable without regard to a case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced
by the regulation: regulations that involve a physical invasion of property and regulations that deny all economically beneficial use of the property).
127 These standards include those in LCDC Goal 18, Implementation Requirement 5, which specifies that the criteria for approving permits for beach protective
structures shall provide that "(a) visual impacts are minimized; (b) necessary access
to the beach is maintained; (c) negative impacts on adjacent property are minimized;
and (d) long-term or recurring costs to the public are avoided."

DEPT OF LAND

CONSERVATION AND DEV., OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS & GUIDE-

LINES 33 (1995 ed.) (incorporated by reference into OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0010

(1998)).
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ranges from aesthetic (e.g., recreational collection of driftwood)
to monetary (commercial excavations of sand and minerals for
resale or to preserve an ocean view from uplands property).1 28
Depending on the circumstances, removal of beach materials by
the dry sand owner could improperly infringe on the public's
easement rights. For example, removing sand could create an artificial beach "lake" and reduce the dry sand area available for
recreation. 129 In contrast, the landowner's removal of salvage
washed ashore (e.g., commercial fishing nets) ordinarily would
not interfere with public recreation.1 3 °
The public's right to gather and remove beach materials may
be more limited than the landowner's. 13' Rights to remove land
materials, being in the nature of a profit A prendre, ordinarily
could not be claimed under the English doctrine of custom. 132 It
is unclear to what extent, if any, this limitation survives in Ore128 See LCDC Goal 18, Implementation Requirement 7, id. at 33-34 ("Grading or
sand movement necessary to maintain views or to prevent sand inundation may be
allowed for structures in foredune areas only if the area is committed to development and only as part of an overall plan for managing foredune grading.").
129 Unreported litigation in 1968 initiated prior to Thornton involved the state's
efforts to enjoin the removal of 20,000 yards of sand from the beach as fill for a
resort development. The removal of the sand created a beach "lake" several hundred feet long. See State Hopes to Stop Beach Sand Removal, THE OREGONIAN
(Portland), Jan. 16, 1968, at 114; Stan Federman, Here Goes Neskowin Again on
Beach Law... Or Does It?, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 14, 1968, at F8.
130 See Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance
of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185,
187 (1974) (stating that in contrast to English common law where the right to a
wreck was in the sovereign, in America the case law allows the littoral owner to
claim this salvage).
131 Recent litigation in Florida involved the takings claim of dry sand owners directed at federal harbor improvements allegedly disrupting the replenishing of sand
on their beach. See Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406 (1996); see generally
Jeremy N. Jungreis, Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sands of Cape Canaveral: Why
Common Beach Erosion Should Not Yield a Compensable Taking Under the Fifth
Amendment, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375 (1996). This potential standing to sue
for a taking based on displacement of sand may constitute another "stick" in the
beach owner's bundle.
132 See, e.g., 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 17, 1 413, 431-32;
Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and
the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 196 (1993);
Blewett v. Tregonning, 111 Eng. Rep. 524 (K.B. 1835) (holding that practice of removing beach sand is a profit that cannot be claimed by custom); Constable v. Nicholson, 143 Eng. Rep. 434 (C.P. 1863) (reaching the same result for alleged custom to
gather beach sand and gravel). Apparently, rights in the nature of a profit, though
not subject to acquisition by custom, could be acquired in England by prescription.
3EX z-12 _BUT
.
AS
'CFENGLAND. su ra note 17. q 431 n.1.
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gon's adoption of the custom doctrine. 3 3 An older Oregon case

did apply this English rule in holding that a right to fish in an
34

Oregon river, being a profit, could not be acquired by custom.1
In State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, however, the court described the

history of public beach use in Oregon to include the gathering of
wood' 3 5-a right in the nature of a profit. Because in most cases
Oregon regulations require a permit to remove beach materials
and condition that permit on permission from the dry sand

owner, this issue is 36not likely to result in litigation at the instance
of the landowner.1
7.

Right to Conduct Commercial Activities on the Beach
The Department of Parks and Recreation closely regulates the

conduct of commercial activities (e.g., lunchcarts and horse rentals) on beaches, presumably those activities of both the dry sand

owner and the enterprising public. For example, permits for
commercial activities other than special events require, among
other things, a finding that the activity existed at the specific
beach location on the effective date of the regulations.

37

More-

over, department permission is required to distribute printed information, such as leaflets, on the beach.' 3 8 Analyzed under the
standard of balancing the interests of landowners and easement
holders, commercial activities of the landowner that facilitate or
further the public's recreational experience may be consistent

with the public's custom rights. Regulation that restricts the activities of the landowner, therefore, may be subjected to case133 Hawai'i's custom doctrine rejects this limitation under English law in favor of
an indigenous construction of the doctrine that recognizes the exercise of traditional
Hawaiian rights to gather food, wood, plants, and other items. See Public Access
Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1269 (Haw.
1995).
134 Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 51 Or. 237, 244, 92 P. 1065, 1070 (1907).
135 State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 586-87, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).
136 See OR. REV. STAT. § 390.725 (1997) (authorizing regulations to govern re-

moval of beach materials, but requiring written permission of landowner where removal affects private lands); OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0035 (1998) (requiring a permit
for removal of sand, rock, minerals, marine growth, or other natural products, other
than fish and wildlife, agates, or souvenirs, and requiring authorization from the fee
owner for removal from privately owned lands); id. 736-027-0030, to -0045 (requiring permit for salvage removal and permission if title to beach where salvage is located belongs to private persons); id. 736-026-0015 ("upland property owner wishes
will be respected when considering vehicle permits for [drift]wood gathering.").
137 Id. 736-021-0130(3).
138 Id. 736-021-0140(2).
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specific analysis as a taking. 139 Conversely, commercial activities
conducted by the enterprising public should be subject to injunction if they infringe unreasonably on the rights of the beach
owner. 140
III
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF COMPETING
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS ON
OREGON'S BEACHES

Regulatory takings claims by Oregon beach owners in many
instances will turn on the relationship between the Thornton custom doctrine and the overlay in Oregon of state and local regulation of beach improvements and other beach uses. 1 4 1 As
recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, the custom doctrine is one of those background
principles of state law inhering in a landowner's title that even
may sustain regulation depriving the owner of all economic use
142
of the land.
The following standards summarize the current thinking of the
United States Supreme Court for takings claims brought under
the federal Constitution. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,1 43 the Supreme Court described two situations in which
regulation is compensable on its face without inquiry into the
public interest it advances: regulation that results in a physical
invasion of property and regulation that denies "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land. ' 144 Such regulation, however, will survive constitutional scrutiny when it inheres in the
landowner's title under pre-existing "background principles" of
139 One particularly onerous requirement in the Department of Parks and Recreation regulations is that no money can be exchanged or payment made on the beach
for approved activities (other than a special event). Id. 736-021-0130(3)(c).
140 Consider the hypothetical situation of a beach festival, operating under a special event permit under OAR 736-021-0130, that will involve the erection of tents
that impair the view from uplands structures. For more discussion of the parameters
of reasonable uses of the beach by the public, see supra Part II.B.1.
141 Cf. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993) (affirming the dismissal of an inverse condemnation action brought by beach owners
who were denied seawall construction permits by both the Oregon Department of
Parks and Recreation and the City of Cannon Beach), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207

(1994).

142 Id. 317 Or. at 142, 854 P.2d at 456.
143 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
1
!44 M.
t 10.
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state property law or nuisance. 145 For takings that are less than
complete (leaving some economically beneficial or productive
use), the legitimacy of the regulation may depend on the degree
46
that it frustrates so-called investment-backed expectations.1

More particularly, exactions and development conditions (e.g.,
conditioning a building permit on dedication of a pedestrian

pathway) require both an "essential nexus" between some "legitimate state interest" (e.g., reducing traffic) and the condition, as

well as a showing of "rough proportionality" between the condition and the impact of the proposed development. 147
The Lucas litigation successfully challenged South Carolina's
Beachfront Management Act which prevented the petitioner
from erecting any permanent habitable structure on his coastal
property and left his lots without economic value. 1 48 Because the

Oregon Supreme Court recognizes the custom of beach recreation as a background principle of Oregon law for purposes of
takings claims, 4 9 presumably any overlay of Oregon regulation
that deprives the beach owner of all economically beneficial use
nevertheless would survive a takings challenge. There are, however, several potential scenarios under which custom would fail
as a background principle in Oregon and expose confiscatory leg15
islation to challenge as a taking.
First, under McDonald v. Halvorson,"' only those beaches
145 Id. at

1029.

See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (plurality decision
includes investment-backed expectations as among factors in scrutinizing regulation
under takings clause). But see Dodd v. Hood River County, 317 Or. 172, 184-85,
855 P.2d 608, 615-16 (1993) (refusing to decide whether investment-backed expectations are part of the takings analysis under the Oregon constitution). See generally
146

TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER
DOLAN AND LUCAS 14-17 (David L. Callies, ed. 1996) (predicting that the Supreme

Court will apply some variant of the investment-backed expectations standard to
partial takings).
147 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (Oregon city failed to demonstrate sufficient relationship between exactions of dedicated floodplain and pedestrian/bicycle pathway and the petitioner's proposed building expansion). It is not
clear whether the standard in Dolan applies when scrutinizing a regulation that does
not involve an exaction or development condition.
148 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (applying finding of trial court that the Act left the
petitioner's lots without economic value).
149 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
150 Note that these potential grounds for nullifying custom as a background principle are also important for partial takings-where the regulation that effects a partial
taking is consistent with a recognized custom, then ordinarily the particular use it
denies was not part of the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.
151 308 Or. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989).
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with "histories of use like the Cannon Beach area" are impressed

with custom. Thus, beach owners who can demonstrate that their
beach has little or no history of public use may hold their title
1 52
free of customary rights.

Second, although the Supreme Court declined an opportunity
to do so when it denied certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach,' the possibility exists that the Court may substitute its

own definition of state background principles of property law for
that of a state court. Under this interventionist approach, presumably the Court would examine whether Oregon's use of custom in Thornton was an "objectively reasonable application of
1' 54
relevant [Oregon] precedents.'
Third, the location of Oregon's overlay of beach regulation,
based on coordinate mapping of the vegetation line, does not always coincide with the actual line of vegetation specified in
Thornton as the landward boundary of the public's custom
rights.15 5 This discrepancy is amplified by the ambulatory nature
of the coastline and the potential for the custom doctrine and
Oregon's beach regulation to deal differently with a relocated
vegetation line. 56
152 See supra Part I.B. Some commentators have questioned whether Oregon's
custom doctrine, as applied in Thornton from border-to-border, denies beach owners their due process right to be heard when custom is applied to their beach. See,
e.g., Bederman, supra note 3, at 1443-46; Steve A. McKeon, Comment, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564, 585 (1970). See also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1214 (1994) (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(objecting to denial of certiorari given "serious" due process claim of petitioners
that Thornton could not have determined their rights to the beach since they were
not parties to the Thornton litigation). The holding in McDonald seems to have
taken most of the bite from this due process argument. Under McDonald, those
who dispute the application of custom to their beach presumably can attempt to
establish a history of private rather than public use.
153 Stevens, 317 Or. 131, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
154 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992)
(stressing that an affirmative decree eliminating all beneficial uses supported by
background principles of property law "may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the
circumstances in which the land is presently found.").
155 See Office of the Majority Leader, House of Representatives, HB 1045, 55th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 18 (Or. 1969) (stating that the line of vegetation determined
under the new coordinate system in the 1969 Beach Bill, replacing the topographic
line in the 1967 Beach Bill, will be a straight line that coincides approximately with
the vegetation line).
156 See supra Part I.C. for discussion of the potential for relocating the public's
customary easement on shifting sands and supra note 44-45 for discussion of the
potential to relocate the vegetation line for purposes of Oregon's regulation of
beach improvements and other beach uses. For example, if the vegetation line were
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Fourth, under the doctrine of custom, the public's recreation
rights on Oregon beaches extend to the line of vegetation but no
further landward.157 Sentiment is growing in Oregon to restrict
development on uplands property in order to avert uplands "con-

domania" that impairs the aesthetic experience of beachgoers
and limits beach access. 158 As articulated in Thornton, the pub-

lic's custom does not include any scenic view easement extending
to private uplands property. Thus, efforts to regulate uplands de-

velopment generally must stand or59fall without the support of the
1
background principle of custom.

Finally, as evident in the central theme of this article, the public's custom rights leave the beach owner free to make any use of

the beach that does not infringe unreasonably on the public's recreational experience. In most instances, Oregon's regulatory
overlay contemplates a similar balancing of public and private

interests. For example, the regulatory criteria for approving permits for beach protective structures, such as seawalls, closely resemble the factors a court would apply in balancing public
160
easement and private ownership rights under the common law.

Nevertheless, the potential exists for the adoption of regulations
imposing absolute prohibitions on coastal uses that, on balance,
may otherwise be reasonable under the common law. In at least
one instance-the prohibition of protective structures fronting
uplands property that was not developed before 1977-Oregon's
to move landward, it is possible that the legislative line would be changed. In contrast, Oregon courts might reject the concept of a rolling easement and custom rights
would end seaward of the legislative reach of beach regulation. In these circumstances, custom could not be relied upon as a background principle in the newly
created beach area.
157 See supra notes 44-45.
158 Fran Recht, The Coast Isn't Safe, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 6, 1997, at

D5 (editorial laments that development is blocking traditional pathways to the
beach and that beachgoers must tolerate ugly and dense uplands development with
more to come); Peter D. Sleeth & Foster Church, Twenty Miserable Miles, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 7, 1997, at Al (reporting recent remarks of former Oregon
governor Bob Straub that a private uplands area above a beach state park is an
Oregon treasure that no developer should have the right to "mess" up).
159 There is some possibility that the background property principle of nuisance
would justify prohibitions on uplands development. But see Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992) (holding on remand from the Supreme
Court that the petitioner's proposed development of his two lots does not amount to
a common law nuisance). There is also the possibility, although more remote, that if
Oregon adopts the rolling easement doctrine, see supra Part I.C., then prohibiting
uplands development could be argued as consistent with the eventual encroachment
of custom landward with the rising ocean and shifting beach.
160 See supra note 53.
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current regulatory overlay appears to have exceeded the bounds
of balance. 61
Because of the unique relationship between the dry sand
beach and uplands property, these principles for a "total" economic taking may seldom apply to the takings claim of an Oregon beach owner. Presumably, most coastal landowners who
own the dry sand beach also own uplands property adjacent to
their beach. Since most of the severe regulation of coastal uses
applies to the beach and not the uplands, it rarely should be the
case that regulation denying all economically beneficial use of
the beach has the same impact on the uplands property.16 2 Thus,
there may not be a total taking if courts include uplands property
in determining whether beach regulation has denied all beneficial
economic use. In the broader setting of takings of property generally, commentators describe this uncertainty as the denominator problem. 163 Because there is great confusion among the
federal courts in defining the relevant parcel for purposes of takings claims, this issue must await guidance from the Supreme
Court. 164
CONCLUSION

In Oregon, the conflict between public and private interests on
its beaches has surged in recent years. Following the use of custom in 1969 to establish easement rights in favor of the public
came a wave of litigation defining the reach of custom on Oregon
shores. 165 Most recently, litigation has focused on whether the
See supra Part II.B.5.
An example of when beach regulation nonetheless could render uplands property without economically beneficial use involves the denial of a seawall permit necessary for development on low-lying uplands. Another example could be where
denial of a seawall leads to destruction of existing uplands improvements.
161
162

163

27

See, e.g., Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem,

RUTGERS
164 Robert

L.J. 663 (1996).

H. Freilich, et al., Regulatory Takings: Factoring PartialDeprivations
into the Taking Equation, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS

(noting in particular the confusion

resulting from the question posed by Justice Scalia in Lucas as to whether the owner
has suffered a deprivation of all economic use when a regulation requires the developer to leave 90% of a tract in its natural state).
165 E.g., McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or. 340, 780 P.2d 714 (1989) (holding public
rights did not extend to beach fronting freshwater pool adjacent to ocean); State
Highway Commission v. Bauman, 517 P.2d 1202 (Or. App. 1974) (affirming trial
court finding that state failed to establish public rights to use sand dune landward of
vegetation line).
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custom doctrine and complementary regulation effect a taking of
the beach owner's property. As the public's customary rights
mature in coastal titles, the focus of disputes will shift from landowner efforts to uproot the public interest entirely to efforts to
define the respective rights and responsibilities of beach owners
and the public in the same sands. Looking further ahead, increasing dissatisfaction with coastal condomania, combined with
the likelihood of rising seas and retreating shorelines, will sweep
the public's attention landward to what is now the uplands.
Other coastal states will see similar struggles, but perhaps only in
Oregon will they be viewed through the lens of the custom
doctrine.
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